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The Law of Cyber Peace
Scott J. Shackelford, JD, PhD ∗

Abstract
Scholars and policymakers are paying greater attention to the application of international
law to the cause of enhancing global cybersecurity. The bulk of this research, though, has been
focused on leveraging international humanitarian law to regulate the conduct of cyber warfare.
Yet much of this work is largely theoretical, given how exceedingly rare it is for a cyber attack to
cross the armed-attack threshold at which point the law of armed conflict is activated. Most of
the cyber risk facing the public and private sectors lies in the arena of cybercrime and espionage.
More scholars have been applying international law ‘below the threshold’ to these issues, but much
more work remains to be done. This Article seeks to address this omission by offering a roadmap
that synthesizes and extends work in this field. The time is ripe for a fresh look at existing
international legal tools that would help us better manage the multifaceted cyber threat. Only then
can an accounting be made of gaps to be filled in by norms, custom, and perhaps one day, new
accords.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
In December 2014, Sony Pictures was the victim of a data breach, allegedly
by a group of hackers known as the “Guardians of Peace” with ties to the North
Korean regime. 1 The breach sparked a wave of partisan commentary, with
President Obama calling the incident an example of “cyber vandalism,” while
Senator John McCain called it “the manifestation of a new kind of warfare.” 2 This
episode highlights the difficulty of classifying cyber operations under international
law, given the widely divergent views that can result from the same fact pattern.
Cybersecurity often seems to be in the eye of the beholder. This begs the question
as to what is the most appropriate legal framework for guiding policymakers’
responses to such incidents. This can be a particularly vexing question for
incidents below the armed attack threshold, at which point the law of armed
conflict is activated, and which is also where the vast majority of cyber operations
fall, 3 from the now infamous 2015 U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
breach to more recent attacks on the South Korean subway, Cisco, and the SWIFT
code system relied on by myriad financial firms. 4 Yet it is also an arena in which
international attention is increasingly being paid. This may be seen by the
governance spectrum of State approaches to enhancing cybersecurity as well as
norm-building efforts such as the 2015 G20 communique on the applicability of
international law to cyberspace, 5 the 2016 G7 cybersecurity statement, 6 and the
G2 cybersecurity code of conduct. 7
Increasing and worthwhile attention has been paid to applying existing
international law to the cause of enhancing global cybersecurity. The bulk of this
research, though, has been focused on leveraging international humanitarian law
1

See, for example, Steve Holland & Doina Chiacu, Obama Says Sony Hack Not an Act of War, REUTERS
(Dec. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/8N7Y-LW3A.

2

Id.
See Brandon Valeriano & Ryan C. Maness, The Coming Cyberspace: The Normative Argument Against
Cyberwarfare, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/9NMQ-4B2Q (“Despite fears of
a boom in cyberwarfare, there have been no major or dangerous hacks between countries.”).

3

4

5

6

7

See Sara Sorcher, OPM Breach a Shadow Over Homeland Security's Appeals to Security Pros, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 7, 2015), https://perma.cc/XS4F-5Z6H; Shannon Hayden, Cyber Attack on
South Korean Subway System Could Be a Sign of Nastier Things to Come, VICE NEWS (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://perma.cc/24QP-4V3R; Warwick Ashford, Cisco Praised for Quick Response to Cyber Attack,
COMPUTER WEEKLY (Oct. 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/LH92-UKEU.
See G20 LEADERS’ COMMUNIQUÉ, ANTALYA SUMMIT (Nov. 15–16, 2015),
https://perma.cc/BU57-9XKX.
G7 Leaders Approve Historic Cybersecurity Agreement, BOS. GLOBAL F. (June 6, 2016),
https://perma.cc/RM3S-FZ2W.
See Teri Robinson, U.S., China Agree to Cybersecurity Code of Conduct, SC MAG. (June 26, 2015),
https://perma.cc/K9GQ-FZPT.
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to regulate the conduct of cyber warfare. 8 Yet much of this work is largely
hypothetical given how exceedingly rare it is for a cyber operation to cross the
armed attack threshold. 9 The majority of the cyber risk facing the public and
private sectors lies in the arena of cybercrime and espionage. 10 More scholars have
been applying international law “below the threshold” to these issues as may be
seen by the Tallinn 2.0 project, 11 but much more work remains to be done. 12 For
example, perhaps surprisingly, relatively little literature exists examining the
potential to leverage private international law to the cause of mitigating global
cyber risk. 13
This Article seeks to help address this omission by offering a roadmap that
synthesizes and extends work in this field. It does so by drawing from
cybersecurity due diligence, cyber risk insurance, project finance, voluntary
frameworks, trade, investment treaties, and underexplored realms of public
international law including the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
global commons regimes, and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). 14 The
time is ripe for a fresh look at existing international legal tools that would help us
better manage the multifaceted cyber threat. Only then can an accounting be made
of gaps to be filled in by norms, ethics, custom, and perhaps one day, new accords.
This work is meant to be a follow-up study to another article analyzing the
applicable international law to cyber operations both above and below the armed
8

9

10
11

12

13

14

See, for example, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICATION TO CYBER WARFARE
17 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) (discussing when a cyber attack could trigger the right of selfdefense) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S.
ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 34, 67 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W.
Dam, & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMIES]. There are varying
interpretations for defining the jus in bello threshold for armed attacks under international law, but
the most common is arguably the equivalent effects test, which requires that for a cyber operation
to be an armed attack, it must have results equivalent to a physical invasion by traditional military
forces.
See, for example, Scott J. Shackelford, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE 3–51 (2014).
TALLINN 2.0, https://perma.cc/G6GB-PPQP (last visited Aug. 9, 2015). TALLINN 2.0 seeks to
unpack the public international law applicable below the armed attack threshold, representing a
follow-up from the widely-discussed TALLINN MANUAL. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 8;
Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and
International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 698 (2014).
But see Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, Beyond State-Centrism: International Law and Non-State Actors
in Cyberspace, 21 J. of CONFLICT & SEC. L. 1, 1 (2016) (unpacking the role of non-state actors in
international cybersecurity).
Cf. Teresa Scassa & Robert J. Currie, New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s Challenges to Jurisdiction,
42 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1030–31 (2011); Christina Parajon Skinner, An International Law Response
to Economic Cyber Espionage, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1165, 1194 (2014).
See generally Scott J. Shackelford, From Net War to Nuclear War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International
Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192 (2009).
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attack threshold, taking into account legal development in the preceding seven
years. 15 It is also a summation of an array of stand-alone efforts investigating
various aspects of the law of cyber peace into a coherent whole while breaking
new conceptual ground, particularly in the rapidly evolving field of private
international cybersecurity law as one component of a “polycentric” approach to
promoting cyber peace. 16
This Article is structured as follows. Section II reviews the private
international law applicable to the cause of promoting a global culture of
cybersecurity, including the rise of “voluntary” cybersecurity risk frameworks. 17
Section III analyzes the applicable public international law below the armed attack
threshold. Finally, Section IV investigates the role that cybersecurity norms may
play as legal harmonization proceeds, along with examining proposed
15
16

17

See id.
See Scott J. Shackelford & Timothy L. Fort, Sustainable Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons from the Green
Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1995, 2032 (2016); Scott J. Shackelford,
Scott Russell, & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons
from the Public and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 50 (2016); Scott J. Shackelford, On Climate
Change and Cyber Attacks: Leveraging Polycentric Governance to Mitigate Global Collective Action Problems, 18
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 653, 711 (2016); Scott J. Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, Toward a StateCentric Cyber Peace: Analyzing the Current State and Impact of National Cybersecurity Strategies on Enhancing
Global Cybersecurity, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 895, 941–42 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford,
Scott Russell, & Jeffrey Haut, Bottoms Up: A Comparison of Voluntary Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 217, 259–60 (2016); Scott J. Shackelford & Zachary Bohm, Securing North American
Critical Infrastructure: A Comparative Case Study in Cybersecurity Regulation, 40 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 61, 69–70
(2016); Scott J. Shackelford, Protecting Intellectual Property and Privacy in the Digital Age: The Use of
National Cybersecurity Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Risk, 19 CHAPMAN L. REV. 445, 464–65 (2016);
Amanda N. Craig, Scott J. Shackelford, & Janine Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry
and Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 786–87 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a
Global Standard of Cybersecurity Care: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework
on Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 354–55
(2015); Eric Richards, Scott J. Shackelford, & Abbey Stemler, Rhetoric Versus Reality: U.S. Resistance
to Global Trade Rules and the Implications for Cybersecurity and Internet Governance, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L.
159, 173 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell, Risky Business: Lessons for Mitigating Cyber
Attacks from the International Insurance Law on Piracy, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 14–15 (2015); Scott J.
Shackelford & Scott Russell, Above the Cloud: Enhancing Cybersecurity in the Aerospace Sector, 10 FIU. L.
REV. 635, 667 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L. Fort, & Jamie D. Prenkert, How Businesses
Can Promote Cyber Peace, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 353, 430–31 (2014); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Using
BITs to Protect Bytes: Promoting Cyber Peace and Safeguarding Trade Secrets through Bilateral Investment Treaties,
52 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 73–4 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New ‘Digital
Divide’: Analyzing the Evolving Role of Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50
STAN. J. INT’L L. 119, 184 (2014); Amanda N. Craig & Scott J. Shackelford, Hacking the Planet, the
Dalai Lama, and You: Managing Technical Vulnerabilities in the Internet through Polycentric Governance, 24
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 381, 423–25 (2014); Scott J. Shackelford, Toward
Cyberpeace: Managing Cyber Attacks through Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1360–64
(2013); Shackelford, supra note 14.
John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary, INFO. SEC. BLOG. (2014),
https://perma.cc/8CLX-YBQC.
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cybersecurity accords and the role that polycentric governance may play in
fostering cyber peace. 18

II. T HE P RIVATE I NTE RNATIONAL L AW OF C YBER P EACE
International law has been defined as “the body of legal rules,” norms, and
standards that applies “between sovereign States” and non-State actors, including
international organizations and multinational companies, enjoying legal
personality. 19 Traditionally, the primary sources of international law include
treaties, custom, 20 and general principles of law. 21 Subsidiary sources of
international law include judicial decisions and scholarly writing. 22 Given the
recent nature and rapid development of cyber-capabilities, there are comparatively
few treaties that specifically address the rights and obligations of States vis-à-vis
cybersecurity, with the notable exception of the Council of Europe Convention
on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention) discussed below. 23 Absent a robust treaty
regime, and given the geopolitical difficulties of negotiating new agreements in
this area, 24 it is vital to clarify the role of existing private and public international
law related to the promotion of cyber peace.
Private international law is a far-reaching and often underappreciated body
of law. 25 Although myriad definitions exist, the Organization of American States
has defined private international law as “the legal framework composed of
conventions, protocols, model laws, legal guides, uniform documents, case law,
practice and custom, as well as other documents and instruments, which regulate
18

Michael D. McGinnis, Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance: An Equilibrium Concept and Examples
from U.S. Health Care, Conference on Self-Governance, Polycentricity, and Development 1 (prepared for
presentation at Renmin University, Beijing, China) (May 8, 2011), https://perma.cc/ZLF8-R3MQ;
Henning Wegener, Cyber Peace, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE 77, 82 (Hamadoun I. Toure &
Perm. Monitoring Panel on Info. Sec. eds., 2011), https://perma.cc/TA8D-VEZP (arguing that
“unprovoked offensive cyber action, indeed any cyber attack, is incompatible with the tenets of
cyber peace.”); SHACKELFORD, supra note 10, at 52–110, 312–366.

19

Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Definition of International Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last
visited May 03, 2017), https://perma.cc/8PJ9-JHKP.

20

Customary international law is often defined as the “general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (A.L.I. 1987).
Statute of the International Court of Justice Art. 38, June 16, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.

21
22
23
24

25

See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 69–71 (4th ed. 1997).
Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167.
See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and National Security in Cyberspace, in AMERICA’S CYBER FUTURE:
SECURITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 5, 19–20 (Kristin M. Lord & Travis Sharp
eds., 2011).
See PAUL B. STEPHAN & JULIE A. ROIN, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND
POLICY vii (4th ed. 2010).
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relationships between individuals in an international context.” 26 Given how
expansive this category of law is, its potential for shaping the emerging field of
international cybersecurity law is immense, ranging from cybersecurity standards
and national frameworks to cybersecurity risk insurance programs, trade and
investment treaties, cybersecurity due diligence, and relevant case law. Many law
firms, for example, see cybersecurity devolving throughout their practice areas,
including the more traditional international law practice groups of project finance,
international trade, and international arbitration. 27 Space constraints prohibit a
comprehensive analysis of each of these facets of private international
cybersecurity law within this Article. Rather, the goal here is to begin to map out
what we know and identify governance gaps to help jumpstart a broader
conversation about the utility of private international law in furthering the cause
of cyber peace. First, though, it is important to define core concepts, beginning
with the notion of “cyber peace” itself.

A. Defining Key
“Cyber Peace”

Terms:

Unpacking

a

“Polycentric”

Private-sector cybersecurity best practices, along with national, bilateral, and
regional bodies acting as norm entrepreneurs that are identified throughout this
study are together conceptualized as components of a “polycentric” approach to
promoting a global culture of cybersecurity. This multi-level, multi-purpose,
multi-functional, and multi-sectoral model, 28 championed by scholars including
Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom, challenges
orthodoxy by demonstrating the benefits of self-organization, networking
regulations “at multiple scales,” 29 and examining the extent to which national and
private control can in some cases coexist with communal management, as may be
seen in the success of the largely self-organized Internet Engineering Task Force,
the body responsible for the communications side of Internet governance. 30 The
field also posits that, due to the existence of free riders in a multipolar world, “a
single governmental unit” is often incapable of managing “global collective action

26
27
28
29
30

Private International Law, ORG. AM. ST. (2017), https://perma.cc/JP2M-5RA9.
See, for example, Cybersecurity, HOGAN LOVELLS LLP, https://perma.cc/9FXR-ZXC5; see Section
II(D), infra.
Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide
to a Complex Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 163, 171–72 (2011).
Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action Problems 1 (Ind. Univ.
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Working Paper Series No. 08–6, Sept. 2008).
For a detailed discussion of early Internet history, see Katie Hafner & Matthew Lyon, WHERE
WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996); Brief History of the Internet,
INTERNET SOC’Y, https://perma.cc/KT8J-DZA9.
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problems” 31 such as cyber attacks. Instead, a polycentric approach recognizes that
diverse organizations working at multiple levels can create different types of
policies that can increase levels of cooperation and compliance, enhancing
“flexibility across issues and adaptability over time.” 32 Such an approach, in other
words, recognizes both the common but differentiated responsibilities of publicand private-sector stakeholders as well as the potential for best practices to be
identified and spread organically, generating positive network effects that could,
in time, result in the emergence of a cascade toward a positive cyber peace. 33
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a U.N. agency
specializing in information and communication technologies, pioneered some of
the early work in the field by defining “cyber peace” in part as “a universal order
of cyberspace” built on a “wholesome state of tranquility, the absence of disorder
or disturbance and violence.” 34 Although certainly desirable, such an outcome is
politically and technically unlikely, at least in the near term. That is why cyber
peace is defined here not as the absence of conflict, a state of affairs that may be
called negative cyber peace. 35 Rather, it is the construction of a network of
multilevel regimes that promote global, just, and sustainable cybersecurity by
clarifying the rules of the road for companies and countries alike to help reduce
the threats of cyber conflict, crime, and espionage to levels comparable to other
business and national security risks. To achieve this goal, a new approach to
cybersecurity is needed that seeks out best practices from the public and private
sectors to enhance cybersecurity due diligence. Working together through
polycentric partnerships, we can mitigate the risk of cyber war by laying the
groundwork for a positive cyber peace that respects human rights, spreads
Internet access along with best practices, and strengthens governance mechanisms
by fostering multi-stakeholder collaboration. 36
31
32

33
34
35

36

Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 35 (World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), https://perma.cc/TW2J-CSJQ.
Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7,
15 (2011). Cf. Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory
Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 157 (2008) (discussing the legitimacy of polycentric regimes,
and arguing that “[a]ll regulatory regimes are polycentric to varying degrees”).
See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L
ORG. 887, 895–98 (1998).
Wegener, supra note 18, at 78.
The notion of negative peace has been applied in diverse contexts, including civil rights. See, for
example, Martin Luther King, Non-Violence and Racial Justice, CHRISTIAN CENTURY 118, 119 (1957)
(arguing “[t]rue peace is not merely the absence of some negative force––tension, confusion or war;
it is the presence of some positive force––justice, good will and brotherhood”).
See Johan Galtung, Peace, Positive and Negative, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PEACE PSYCHOLOGY 1,
758, 762 (Daniel J. Christie ed., 2011) (comparing the concepts of negative and positive peace). For
more on this topic, see generally SHACKELFORD, supra note 10, at preface. Another related literature
that should be explored further stems from the U.S. constitutional law context, including Federalist
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The following Section begins the exploration of how we can leverage private
international law to promote cyber peace from the bottom up, starting with
private-sector cybersecurity innovations that are helping to define a global
standard of cybersecurity care including due diligence, cyber risk insurance,
project finance, and international arbitration. Next, the movement toward
“voluntary” cybersecurity frameworks is analyzed as a data set to begin a more
thorough analysis of the current status of customary international cybersecurity
law, before turning to bilateral, regional, and global trade and investment treaty
frameworks.

B. Cybersecurity Due Diligence
What is cybersecurity due diligence? In the private-sector transactional
context, this term has been defined as “the review of the governance, processes
and controls that are used to secure information assets,” 37 which makes it stand
apart from more outwardly focused public international law concepts of due
diligence. This increasingly central concept to a variety of governmental and
business activities, as it is used here, builds from this definition and may be
understood as the customary national and international obligations of both State
and non-State actors to help identify and instill cybersecurity best practices and
effective governance mechanisms so as to promote cyber peace through
enhancing the security of computers, networks, and information and
communication technology (ICT) infrastructure. Cybersecurity due diligence
obligations may exist between States, between non-State actors (for example,
private corporations and end-users), and between State and non-State actors. 38
But determining exactly what nations’ due diligence obligations are to secure their
networks and to prosecute or extradite cyber attackers is no simple feat.
Surprisingly, this central concept has received little attention in the literature. 39
No. 10, which discusses the extent to which heterogeneous collaboration can mitigate conflict. See
The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
37
38

39

Tim Ryan & Leonard Navarro, Cyber Due Diligence: Pre-Transaction Assessments Can Uncover Costly Risks,
KROLL CALL (Jan. 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/W8BB-ZVRA.
An earlier version of this research was previously published as Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell,
& Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public
and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2016).
Cf. John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 105 AM. J. INT'L
L. 775, 795 (2011) (“Cybersecurity Due Diligence: States should recognize and act on their
responsibility to protect information infrastructures and secure national systems from damage or
misuse.”); John M. Prescott, Responses to Five Questions on National Security Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1536, 1548 (2012) (discussing the U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace); Shackelford,
Toward Cyberpeace, supra note 16, at 1354. See also Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in
Cyberspace, 125 YALE L.J. F. 68, 81 (2016) (“[I]nternational law acknowledges that the right of
sovereignty and the corresponding duty of due diligence must be in equilibrium. As a matter of law,
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This Subsection summarizes the current state of play in this field focusing on
relevant International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence—namely Corfu
Channel, 40 Trail Smelter, 41 and Nicaragua 42—as well as evidence from the private
sector to enrich the discussion before moving on to the related topic of cyber risk
insurance.
The first relevant ICJ case regarding the due diligence obligations of nations
is Corfu Channel, particularly the holding in that decision that one country’s territory
should not be “used for acts that unlawfully harm other States.” 43 As applied to
cybersecurity (a very different context from its nautical origins), this decision
could implicate a duty to terminate cyber emanations from a State’s own territory,
as well as perhaps a duty to warn other States as to vulnerabilities in its networks
that could be exploited by malicious actors and used to harm other nations. 44 Yet
this interpretation would be difficult to enforce in practice given the wide array of
vulnerabilities replete in a nation’s networks, only some of which may be under a
nation’s direct control, as may be seen by the more than eighty-five percent of
U.S. critical infrastructure that is in private hands. 45 Moreover, the growing use of
cloud-based services can engender complex jurisdictional issues, 46 while the duty
to warn may have itself been subsumed by the 2015 G20 communiqué that called
for a duty to assist victim nations, 47 which could implicitly include a duty to warn
these nations of impending attacks.
An ad hoc international tribunal also addressed what could become the
contours of a cybersecurity due diligence norm in its Trail Smelter decision, which
centered on pollution crossing the U.S.-Canadian border giving rise to adverse
health and environmental effects. The decision, among other things, was
concerned about the nature of Westphalian sovereignty, and whether modern
notions of sovereignty should be based just on territory, or whether the effects

40
41
42

43
44
45
46

47

therefore, the due diligence obligation does not require a state to take measures that are beyond its
means or otherwise unreasonable.”).
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, ¶ 49 (April 9).
Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 Rep. Int’l Arb Awards (R.I.A.A.) 1905 (1941).
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 106-08, 183 (June 27). However, it should be noted that other ICJ jurisprudence is
also on point and is not discussed here due to space constraints, including: Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion – General Assembly, ICJ Reports, 8 July 1996, at 22, ¶ 29;
Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, 20 April 2010, ¶ 193.
Corfu Channel, supra note 40.
Eneken Tikk, Ten Rules of Behavior for Cyber Security, 53 SURVIVAL 119, 126 (2011).
See, for example, STEPHEN FLYNN, THE EDGE OF DISASTER: REBUILDING A RESILIENT NATION 139
(2007).
See, for example, Cloudy Jurisdiction: Addressing the thirst for Cloud Data in Domestic Legal Processes,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Internet Governance Forum-Baku 2012),
https://perma.cc/CT7S-8PRD.
See G20 COMMUNIQUÉ, supra note 5.
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arising from one nation that impact another could also give rise to obligations
through the emerging doctrine of effects jurisdiction. 48 Ultimately, Trail Smelter
held that “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory . . . to
cause injury by fume . . . to the territory of another . . . when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.” 49
Even though the decision was directed towards the emission of “fumes,” Trail
Smelter has come to represent the broader “no harm” principle, which requires of
States “that activities within their jurisdiction or control respect the environment
of other States.” 50 This “no harm” principle, although directed towards the
environment, may enjoy parallels with cyberspace and cybersecurity, and may
serve as the foundation for a broader State obligation not to permit domestic
activities that result in serious international consequences. Yet it should be noted
that this precedent does not yet enjoy widespread State practice, given that it could
implicate a huge array of transboundary harms. Still, the reference to “serious
consequences” could suggest a graduated cybersecurity due diligence obligation
not to permit, for example, harms above a certain threshold, be they
environmental or digital.
Finally, the ICJ addressed the core issue of State sovereignty in its Nicaragua
decision when the Court stated that nations have an obligation not to interfere in
one another’s domestic affairs if that intervention relates to “the choice of a
political, economic, social, and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign
policy.” 51 This ruling may be read as being in contrast to the Court’s effects
jurisdiction analysis in Trail Smelter. It also tracks the divergent State practice on
Internet governance, with some States asserting varying degrees of Internet
sovereignty while others profess Internet freedom and the virtues of the “global
networked commons.” 52 How multi-stakeholder Internet governance may be
balanced with classic conceptions of State sovereignty over the long run remains
unclear, but the potential for domestic cyber policies to have international
ramifications has arguably never been greater; 53 a case in point being the European
48

49
50
51
52

53

See, for example, SIGRUN SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: STATES’ HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 50 (2006).
Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 41.
Ralph Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW, IUS GENTIUM:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE 447, 457–58 (Erkki Hollo et al. eds., 2012).
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, supra note 42.
Clinton’s Speech on Internet Freedom, January 2010, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 21, 2010),
https://perma.cc/B685-3QSV.
See, for example, Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.
2006); JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 5 (2006).
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Court of Justice’s 2015 Safe Harbor decision, which has rippled across
cyberspace. 54
In summary, the international jurisprudence is unsettled, and, as such, is far
from dispositive on the question of a cybersecurity due diligence norm. Both State
practice and lessons from the private sector can and should be considered to help
build out the private international law of cyber peace, which thus far has been
largely untapped to answer such questions. For example, facets of national
cybersecurity strategies could, in time, crystallize into customary international law
as State practice clarifies. 55 Similarly, given the extensive public-private crosspollination of cybersecurity best practices, private-sector efforts aimed at
enhancing cybersecurity are informative given the extent to which they are shaping
national policymaking, with the 2014 National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework being a case in point. 56
Jason Weinstein, former deputy assistant attorney general at the U.S.
Department of Justice, summarized the issue of cybersecurity due diligence
succinctly when he said: “When you buy a company, you’re buying their data, and
you could be buying their data-security problems.” 57 In other words, “[c]yber risk
should be considered right along with financial and legal due diligence
considerations.” 58 Already a majority of respondents in one 2014 survey reported
that cybersecurity challenges are altering the M&A landscape, while eighty-two
percent said that cyber risk would become more predominant over the following
eighteen months. 59 Simply put, according to Thomas J. Smedinghoff, of counsel
at Locke Lord Edwards LLP, “The cybersecurity situation of the company you
are acquiring affects the value of the company, it affects the liability you might be
taking on, and it affects the costs you might have to incur.” 60 Managers now
considering what form cybersecurity due diligence should take have a wealth of

54

55
56
57

58
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60

See Natalia Drozdiak & Sam Schechner, EU Court Says Data-Transfer Pact With U.S. Violates Privacy,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-court-strikes-down-trans-atlanticsafe-harbor-data-transfer-pact-1444121361; Scott J. Shackelford, Seeking a Safe Harbor in a Widening
Sea: Unpacking the EJC’s Schrems Decision and What it Means for Transatlantic Relations, SETON HALL J.
DIPL. & INT’L REL. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing the case in some detail).
See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Assessment of Customary International Law, INT’L
COMM. RED CROSS (2005), https://perma.cc/SH46-EVFM.
See Update on the Cybersecurity Framework, NIST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://perma.cc/2FKE-RM2W.
Rachel Ensign, Cybersecurity Due Diligence Key in M&A Deals, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/04/24/cybersecurity-due-diligence-key-in-madeals/.
Erin Ayres, Cybersecurity Easing its Way into M&A Due Diligence, ADVISEN (Aug. 22, 2014),
https://perma.cc/W27L-4TLE.
Id.
Michael Greene, M&A Due Diligence Must Include Cybersecurity Analysis, Attorneys Say, BNA (May 20,
2015), https://perma.cc/ZA5D-55SG.
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resources (as well as a growing array of compliance obligations) to consider. 61
These include, in the U.S. context, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework discussed
further below, 62 as well as guidance from the Securities and Exchange
Commission, National Association of Corporate Directors, and the Payment Card
Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council. 63 Together, these frameworks, and
others, provide the beginnings of a cybersecurity due diligence standard guiding
judges as they work through causes of action such as breach of fiduciary duty and
negligence resulting from data breaches. 64
Despite some progress, though, many remain predominantly reactive in their
cybersecurity stances. 65 In order to improve the status quo, firms must leverage
proactive cybersecurity best practices ranging from risk-based data management
to minimizing the danger of insider threats through meshing corporate and human
resources policies and reviewing the cybersecurity track records of vendors and
potential partners. 66 Over time, as legal harmonization progresses, there will be
more opportunities to build out cybersecurity norms, including due diligence,
which is already being assisted by the rapid growth and sophistication of the cyber
risk insurance market.

C. Cyber Risk Insurance
Insurance has been called a “key part of the [cybersecurity] solution,” but it
has only recently begun to catch on, albeit in fits and starts. 67 After all, insurance
is a primary way that we as a society manage risky behavior across myriad sectors,
from car accidents to healthcare. Indeed, state and federal law even requires the
purchasing of different types of insurance to mitigate risk—including car and
health insurance—which begs the question, why not cyber risk insurance? The
trouble, as we will see, lies in the accurate assessment of risk. Still, as data models
and frameworks improve, such policies are increasingly popular tools for a
growing array of small- and medium-sized enterprises as well as multinational
61
62

63
64

65
66

67

See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY CYBERSECURITY
FRAMEWORK 1 (2014), https://perma.cc/H924-X77W.
See Ayres, supra note 58.
Cf. Willingham v. Global Payment, 2013 WL 440702 at *19 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013) (reflecting an
alternative view in which courts are reluctant rely on data security standards as a means of determine
whether a duty was owed).
See MCAFEE, UNSECURED ECONOMIES: PROTECTING VITAL INFORMATION 6 (2009),
https://perma.cc/X38C-DRDP.
For more on this topic, see generally Amanda N. Craig, Scott J. Shackelford, & Janine Hiller,
Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721 (2015).
Interview with Chris Palmer, Google engineer and former technology director, Electronic Frontiers
Foundation, in San Francisco, Cal. (Feb. 25, 2011).

Summer 2017

13

Chicago Journal of International Law

corporations and major universities. Even the U.S. government has begun to
discuss ways in which to encourage the more rapid update of cyber risk insurance
policies. 68 Indeed, according to Roger Smith of Allianz, “Cyber insurance is
probably the fastest growing insurance in the world.” 69 This Subsection discusses
the triumphs and travails of the cyber risk insurance market before moving on to
related due diligence considerations.
Insurance firms have been experimenting with cyber risk insurance policies
for more than a decade; Zurich North America, for example, began offering “a
reward for information leading to the conviction of” cyber terrorists back in
2002. 70 By some estimates the market will be worth more than $7.5 billion by 2020
with an increasing number of firms looking to invest in coverage, 71 a trend that
could be reinforced depending on regulatory developments such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) cyber attack disclosure guidelines. 72 Other
nations are going further, with Australia requiring cyber attack disclosure in
2016, 73 which could better inform the process of quantifying risk premiums. As
one 2008 survey explained, “cyber insurance is a concept that has a great deal of
intellectual appeal, has seen a degree of implementation, but that isn’t taking the
enterprise world by storm.” 74 Part of the reason is cost. 75 While some small firms
like Brookeland Fresh Water Supply in East Texas, from which cybercriminals
stole $35,000, have been kept afloat by insurance (because of its insurance policy,
68

69

70

71

72
73
74
75

See SANS Institute, WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 24 (2003),
https://perma.cc/P6L8-CUZ9; Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. § 15(1), (2009)
(providing for the creation of “a market for cybersecurity risk management, including the creation
of a system of civil liability and insurance (including government reinsurance)”).
Emily Stewart, Cyber Attack Insurance Growing Fast, ABC (Oct. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/CW2WUW3E.
Jon Swartz, Firms’ Hacking-Related Insurance Costs Soar, USA TODAY (Feb. 9, 2003),
https://perma.cc/U4F6-YB92; see Press Release, Hiscox, Safeonline Launches Internet Security
Insurance, https://perma.cc/AV5J-MWLQ.
See Jim Finkle, Cyber Insurance Premiums Rocket After High-Profile Attacks, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2015),
https://perma.cc/6AVX-GPL9; Nicole Perlroth, Insurance Against Cyber Attacks Expected to Boom,
N.Y. TIMES BITS (Dec. 29, 2011), https://perma.cc/Q4B8-DW6F.; Robert Lemos, Should SMBs
Invest in Cyber Risk Insurance?, DARK READING (Sept. 9, 2010), https://perma.cc/HXU2-7LPZ.
See Perlroth, supra note 71.
Stewart, supra note 69.
Robert Richardson, CSI Computer Crime & Security Survey at 11 (2008), https://perma.cc/PH8H3JLJ.
See Lemos, supra note 71; see also Travelers Adds Cyber Protection Tailored to Small Businesses, INS. J. (Jan.
22, 2013), https://perma.cc/SA75-U76X. DHS summarized the current state of cyber risk
insurance in 2012, noting that “[w]hile a sizable third-party market exists to cover losses suffered
by a company’s customers, first-party policies that address direct harms to companies themselves
remain expensive, rare, and largely unattractive.” DHS, CYBERSECURITY INSURANCE WORKSHOP
READOUT REPORT 1 (2012), https://perma.cc/L2QE-L4BC; Nathan Brown, The Costs of Having
(and NOT Having) Cyber Insurance, NEXTECH (Mar. 31, 2015), https://perma.cc/STX2-28LX.
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instead of going out of business, it only lost its $500 deductible), many other small,
medium, and large enterprises have been refused coverage. 76 If managers are not
forthcoming, or do not have adequate safeguards in place, then the insurance
company may decline coverage, as happened to British electrical grid operators in
early 2014. 77 And since cyber attacks can happen irregularly, the cost of protection
may not always be worth it, 78 especially given the need for applicant firms to pass
the equivalent of a cybersecurity audit. 79
Calculating cyber risk insurance premiums is no simple matter; there is little
reliable data—a factor that is critical, 80 for example, to pricing healthcare and
automobile insurance. Still, many firms are moving forward despite the relative
newness of the problem and the relative lack of incentives for effective
information sharing, which can result in skewed calculations. 81 This is
notwithstanding the fact that annual premiums can run from the thousands to the
hundreds of thousands depending on the type and size of organization seeking
coverage. 82 Geography matters in the number of insurance options that firms
have—Australian companies, for example, can reportedly choose from fifteen
carriers, 83 whereas there are more than twenty providers in the U.S. depending on
the specific market in question. 84 And there is evidence that deductibles are rising
in step with proliferating cyber risk with some firms reportedly limiting their total
coverage to $100 million. 85 Healthcare companies and retailers in particular—with
both sectors having experienced recent high-profile breaches, such as Anthem and
Target—are experiencing some of the steepest rises, with some firms facing a
76
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See The Case for Cybersecurity Insurance, Part II, KREBS ON SEC. (Jul. 10, 2010), https://perma.cc/994QXBLN; see also Tony Morbin, Should You Use Cyber Insurance to Mitigate Risk?, SC MEDIA (Aug. 20,
2014), https://perma.cc/9EF5-SDKA.
See Mark Ward, Energy Firm Cyber-Defense is ‘Too Weak’, Insurers Say, BBC (Feb. 26, 2014),
https://perma.cc/93XK-TESE.
Cf. Denise Dubie, Corporate Security Spending Not in Line with Real-World Requirements, NETWORK
WORLD (May 2003), https://perma.cc/6U69-ATJN. But see Riva Richmond, How to Determine If
Cyber Insurance Coverage Is Right for You, ENTREPENEUR (June 5, 2012), https://perma.cc/8EJSMES6; Morbin, supra note 76.
See, for example, Brooke Yates & Katie Varholak, Cyber Risk Insurance - Navigating the Application Process,
SHERMAN & HOWARD (June 6, 2013), https://perma.cc/6BM2-VCN9.
But see Sarah Veysey, Insurers Urge Anonymous Database to Help Underwrite Cyber Risks, BUS. INS. (May
23, 2016), https://perma.cc/EBE8-9SJP (“The Association of British Insurers has called for a
national anonymous database of cyber incidents to enable the insurance market to better assess,
underwrite and price cyber risks.”).
See DHS, supra note 75, at 1.
Stewart, supra note 69.
Id.
See, for example, CYBER INSURANCE: A LAST LINE OF DEFENSE WHEN TECHNOLOGY FAILS, LATHAM
& WATKINS CLIENT ALERT 1675, at 1 (Apr. 15, 2014), https://perma.cc/C7RA-RZJS.
See Finkle, supra note 71.
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tripling of costs. 86 Anthem, for example, had to agree to pay the first $25 million
of future breach costs out of pocket before it could get insured for $100 million
in coverage. 87 Target reportedly was hoping to cover $90 million of the $264
million in losses from its 2014 breach through insurance. 88 Some discounts are
available, though, to help with spiraling costs; Bryce and AIG, for example, have
a history of offering rebates for firms using secure hardware and software
packages. 89 Other insurers are going further. Ben Beeson of Lockton Companies,
for example, has stated that, “Insurers are promoting newer technologies for
securing payment card transactions that exceed credit card companies'
requirements, such as tokenization and end-to-end encryption.” 90 Over time, such
efforts could help ratchet up the overall level of cybersecurity preparedness across
a range of businesses. And there is plenty of room to grow with an array of
industries, such as manufacturing, as well as the public sector, largely lacking
coverage. 91 Still, there is an active debate underway about the utility of
incentivizing the purchase of cyber risk insurance given that it could lead to moral
hazard by contributing to a more reactive mindset on the part of managers,
meaning that it should only be considered as one piece in a polycentric approach
aimed at managing cyber risk.

D. Project Finance and International Arbitration
Many leading global law firms include project finance practice groups that
help arrange financing for large infrastructure projects around the world. To take
one example, Hogan Lovells LLP has been involved with deals ranging from
defense and healthcare to light rail, sanitation, and satellites, in deals totaling more
than $250 billion as of 2016. 92 Cybersecurity is forming an increasingly important
component of these deals. This trend has been recognized by such groups as the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which noted in a 2015 report
that, “[b]roker-dealers are increasingly exposed to cybersecurity risks, and
breaches at a broker-dealer could entail adverse implications for investors, firms,
capital markets and even broader swaths of the financial system.” 93 Ensuring that
86
87
88
89
90
91

92
93

See id.
Id.
Id.
See DHS, supra note 75, at 1.
Finkle, supra note 71.
See Caitlin Bronson, The 5 US Industries Most Uninsured Against Cyber Risk, INS. BUS. AM. (Oct. 12,
2015), https://perma.cc/Z3E5-2JW4; Matt Williams, Why Most Governments Don’t Carry Cyber
Insurance, GOVT. TECH. (Aug. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/YY7A-UTAY.
See Infrastructure, Energy, Resources, and Projects, HOGAN LOVELLS, https://perma.cc/A9EQ-CFX8.
FINRA Issues Report on Cybersecurity Practices, Cybersecurity Investor Alert, FINRA (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://perma.cc/LE5Z-3H8L.
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a robust set of cybersecurity best practices is in place across the financial industry
and within law firms (which are themselves often the targets of cyber attackers 94)
can do a great deal to help mitigate cyber risk.
When project finance deals go awry, or nations pass policies or even
expropriate investments, international dispute resolution proceedings including
arbitration may result, which are fast becoming another major (if somewhat
controversial 95) component of many firms international practice groups. One
particular facet of this practice that is increasingly of interest in the cybersecurity
context is the rise of investment treaty arbitration under bilateral investment
treaties (BITs), which are discussed further below. 96 In short, investment treaty
arbitration is a treaty-based regime that leverages the rules and structures of
international law along with private arbitration to make binding decrees on
governments regarding the regulatory relationship between investors and the
State. 97 Myriad forums exist for investment-treaty arbitration, but among the most
important is the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID). This specific arbitral process is important since it is designed
to overcome the adjudicatory problems that often arise when a sovereign is
involved in an international commercial transaction. The ICSID process is
supposed to be autonomous, so much so that contracting States cannot even
entertain challenges to ICSID awards. In practical effect, the only power a national
court retains over ICSID judgments is the ability to recognize and enforce the
ICSID award itself, subject to the ICSID internal appeal procedure created within
the ICSID framework.
As of April 2016, the ICSID Convention has been ratified by 161 States, 98
yet it suffers from an underwhelming number of submitted cases. 99 Some
commentators, such as noted arbitration authority Professor Thomas
Carbonneau, highlight the problems associated with enforcement as one of the
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See Nicole Hong & Robin Sidel, Hackers Breach Law Firms, Including Cravath and Weil Gotshal, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/NJS5-CVTK.
For example, concerns have long centered on limitations to national sovereignty, with critics arguing
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given the public importance of the issues at stake in many of the cases.” ANTHONY R. PARRA, THE
HISTORY OF ICSID 238 (2012) (arguing that “Other influential voices were raised to argue that
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See Section II(F), infra.
For more on this topic, see Shackelford et al., Using BITs to Protect Bytes, supra note 16 (representing
the first publication of parts of this analysis).
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), List of Contracting States and
Other Signatories of the Convention (as of April 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/XF4M-DJT5.
See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), The ICSID Caseload –
Statistics: Issue 2016-1 at 7–9, https://perma.cc/AT6Q-DAB4.
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main obstacles to wider use of the ICSID Convention. 100 The ability of a state to
essentially renege on its promise to arbitrate and enforce an award is a troubling
aspect of the ICSID process, a concern that is further compounded by the
traditional confidentiality of arbitration proceedings and awards. Indeed, beyond
investment disputes, international commercial arbitration is a closed—almost
secret—process. Shrouded behind a curtain of confidentiality (so sacrosanct that
some national courts have inserted confidentiality into an otherwise silent
arbitration agreement 101), the end result is that international arbitration has limited
precedential value in building a law of cyber peace. For example, a search of the
Investor-State Law Guide—a leading resource for international arbitral
decisions—conducted in October 2015 for various key terms referencing
cybersecurity only resulted in a single result for the prefix “cyber.” This 2015 case,
Lao Holdings, did not deal with cybersecurity per se, but rather related areas such
as “cyber gossip.” 102 Other arbitral decisions may well have referenced
cybersecurity as of this writing, but the fact that many are kept confidential means
that their precedential value is quite limited.

E. The Rise of “Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks
At the next level up from private-sector innovation in the due diligence,
insurance, project finance, and arbitration arenas, States are also experimenting
with a wide array of frameworks and other bottom-up cybersecurity governance
efforts aimed at securing critical infrastructure, protecting trade secrets, and
mitigating the risk of cyber conflict. 103 Among other arenas, this trend may be seen
in an increasing array of nations, including the U.S., 104 creating voluntary
cybersecurity frameworks designed to help foster a culture of cybersecurity

100
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For example, the English courts have previously made such a declaration. See Anjanette H
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Business and Society?, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 479 (2005) (discussing the English case of City of
Moscow v. Bankers Trust, [2004] All ER (D) 62 (Jan)).
See Lao Holdings N.V. & The Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Discussion
on the Merits (June 10, 2015), at 40, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/12/6.
See, for example, Matthew Braga, Canada Doesn’t Know How to Regulate Cyber Weapons Sales,
MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc/5JMY-9PPR.
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Introduction, LAWFARE (May 17, 2012), https://perma.cc/N67K-XFWW; Michael Daniel, Assessing
Cybersecurity Regulations, WHITE HOUSE (May 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/VB7N-BML3 (“The
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particularly among critical infrastructure providers. 105 This effort, led by NIST, 106
is breaking new ground when it comes to fashioning a standard of cybersecurity
care that is already having an impact not only in the U.S., but around the world
with NIST actively collaborating with several dozen nations. It may indeed be true
that none of these nations have gotten the regulatory mix exactly right given the
continuing prevalence of cyber attacks across them, 107 but it is equally accurate
that learning can and does happen across nations and sectors that could lead to
what Professors Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu call “regulatory spillover effects,”
which can “be good or bad, depending on which regulatory scheme prevails.” 108
As such, it is important not to ignore State practice when it comes to building out
the law of cyber peace. Space constraints prohibit a thorough recounting of all the
relevant available data. 109 However, in summary, these nations and the E.U.
generally (out of the more than twenty with which NIST has had active
consultations) are, to a greater or lesser extent, emulating various aspects of the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework in their domestic policymaking. The U.K., Italy,
Japan, and, to a lesser extent, Australia seem to be the most supportive of many
aspects of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, as is the E.U., as seen in its
support of core NIST Cybersecurity Framework terminology. In contrast, South
Korea’s philosophy of more top-down cybersecurity policymaking stands in
contrast to the spirit of bottom-up cybersecurity governance, even as it engages
with the U.S. on NIST Cybersecurity Framework deployment. Such State practice
is informative in discussions relating to cybersecurity norm development, a topic
unpacked further in Section IV.
At the next conceptual level up from domestic policymaking, it is also
important to note the role played by national cybersecurity strategies in laying out
how nations view both the cybersecurity challenge and the role of the State in
meeting it. 110 For example, in an analysis of thirty-four national cybersecurity
strategies undertaken in 2015, it was found that fifty-six percent of the nations
105
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107
108
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surveyed referenced the importance of information sharing as a key component
of managing the multifaceted cyber threats to critical infrastructure, whereas only
twenty-four percent mentioned the need for new regulation to enhance critical
infrastructure cybersecurity. 111 These data help illustrate the extent to which there
is a reticence on the part of a number of nations about taking a too heavy-handed
role when it comes to regulating cybersecurity, highlighting the attractiveness of a
more bottoms-up NIST Cybersecurity Framework-like approach.
Still, it remains unclear exactly how many nations will follow the lead of these
countries in preferring a bottoms-up approach to cybersecurity risk management.
Indeed, some of the leading cyber powers—including China and Russia—favor
more State-centric approaches to enhancing critical infrastructure cybersecurity.
This may be seen in the Russian government’s stated goal of by 2020 centralizing
its efforts to detect and prevent cyber attacks, including those on critical
infrastructure, giving over many functions to the Federal Security Service (FSB). 112
Moreover, regime effectiveness studies are notoriously difficult to undertake in
this context. For example, the U.S. has more than 3,200 independent power
utilities, unlike, for example, Germany, which has four major providers. 113 Some
U.S. firms are taking appropriate steps to secure their systems, but differences in
resources and expertise make the uptake of best practices haphazard in a purely
bottoms-up system, 114 even as more space for experimentation and innovation is
possible with so many actors identifying and instilling best practices. 115 Thus, as
State practice crystallizes further, and by mining data such as has begun to be
gathered by the International Telecommunication Union, 116 further research is
required to better understand the most effective role for States in furthering a
customary law of cyber peace.

F. Bilateral Investment Treaties
Beyond State practice, there is an increasingly important role being played
by minilateral legal instruments in promoting especially bilateral cybersecurity,
though realizing the full benefit of these instruments will require reform as is
111
112
113
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See Letter from Michael Assante, NERC Vice President and Chief Security Officer, to Industry
Stakeholders (Apr. 7, 2009), https://perma.cc/H437-PHJE (discussing designating critical cyber
assets).
For more on the methodological challenges of undertaking cybersecurity regime effectiveness
studies, see SHACKELFORD, supra note 10, at 312–66.
See GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX, supra note 109.
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discussed below. Before delving into the role of BITs in potentially protecting
bytes, though, it is first important to offer some context. During the colonial era
up to the nineteenth century, the leading developed nations held the view that
foreign investors were entitled to property rights protections under international
law, and that if their property was in fact taken then they were entitled to “prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation.” 117 The modern terminology to describe
such expropriations arose in the 1930s in a dispute between the governments of
Mexico and the U.S. involving confiscated agrarian and oil properties, some of
which were owned by U.S. citizens, resulting in a now famous diplomatic
exchange between U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the Mexican Minister
of Foreign Affairs. 118 In one of Hull’s notes, he put forward a standard for
compensation that became the leading formulation for the protection of investor
property rights under customary international law through the 1970s: “no
government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose,
without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore.” 119
Gradually, though, with the colonial era ending, new legal insturments began to
take the place of the Hull Rule, namely the rise of BITs that have, over time,
become the most important legal mechanism for the encouragement and
governance of foreign direct investment (FDI) and, increasingly, trade secret
protections.
BITs accord wide-ranging rights to investors, including the protection of
contractual rights, and recourse to international arbitration should any disputes
arise, 120 a topic of increasing political sensitivity both in Europe and the U.S. 121
The driving force behind this facet of international law has been the rapid growth
of FDI, which, according to the World Bank, “increased seven fold from . . . 1970
to 2000.” 122 By 2012, FDI stocks had risen to some $22 trillion. 123 These growing
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figures have fueled the rise of BITs, which numbered nearly 3,000 by 2013 124 and
covered a large range of industry sectors and business activities. 125 At the July 2013
China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, for example, the U.S. and China
publicized plans to begin negotiating an expansive BIT that will reportedly include
the difficult issue of enhancing bilateral cybersecurity. 126 According to U.S.
Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew, if successful, this would be “the first time China
has agreed to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty, to include all sectors and
stages of investment, with another country.” 127 Although some questions already
have arisen regarding the seriousness of both sides in the negotiations, with direct
investment between China and the U.S. increasing and trade secrets theft showing
few signs of abating, 128 the potential for significant progress that could help
deepen the U.S.-Chinese cybersecurity dialogue exists. 129 Indeed, it may already
be bearing some fruit with the U.S.-China “cyber accord” in September 2015 that
included measures to fight intellecutal property theft. 130
In the U.S., trade secret theft of a product in interstate or international
commerce violates the Economic Espionage Act131 if “the intended beneficiary is
a foreign power.” 132 However, the utility of the Economic Espionage Act in
prosecuting trade secret theft is limited in the context of foreign state-sponsored
cyber attacks that target corporate trade secrets, given the difficulties of
attribution, extradition, and determining an appropriate forum to resolve the
dispute—hence the potential value of investor-state arbitration. Other applicable
U.S. statutes include the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 133 the National Stolen
Property Act, 134 wire fraud, 135 and the 2016 Defend Trade Secrets Act, which
created a federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. 136
124
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The world’s various legal systems and cultures maintain different levels of
intellectual property protections. Therefore, as emphasized by U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State William Burns, the U.S. and China, for example, “need to reach
a shared understanding of the rules of the road” 137 in cyberspace. BITs may be a
vehicle to engender such norms. The use of BITs in this manner provides two key
elements often lacking in other protective regimes like the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): grievances that fall
within the purview of a BIT not only can be pursued by an individual but also can
be resolved within an internationally-accepted arbitration mechanism. The use of
arbitration provides several advantages, as has been mentioned, such as the use of
a neutral setting for resolution of grievances, well-established rules of arbitration
and enforcement of awards, and access to and the use of well-established investordispute focused arbitration institutions. And of course, pursuing a claim under a
BIT agreement allows a foreign investor to bring a claim against that host state in
investor-state arbitration without the need to petition its home government to
initiate dispute settlement proceedings. 138
Despite its advantages, BIT-based investment arbitration is not without its
detractors. Unlike its predecessor—the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation discussed in Section III—BITs are designed to be less complicated
and more narrowly focused. However, they also are prone to unpredictable and,
at times, even inconsistent interpretation. Their brevity created an apparent
justification for judicial activism in order to clarify vague treaty language and to
close gaps left open by the drafters. 139 As a result of this and other concerns, states
have begun reconsidering their approach to investment treaties. As some
countries started to denounce their BITs, others, like Bolivia and Ecuador, exited
the ICSID Convention altogether. 140 In fact, States became more hesitant to
negotiate BITs. 141 This relative decline in BIT enactment and participation rates
cannot be explained by a saturation of the field alone. 142 Rather, more and more
countries have put their BIT programs on hold in order to re-evaluate their
approach to investment policymaking. These statistics highlight the ambiguity
with which many nations view BITs and investor-state arbitration, with BIT rates
137
138
139
140
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See Wolfgang Alschner, Interpreting Investment Treaties as Incomplete Contracts: Lessons from Contract Theory,
(SSRN ID No. 2241652, Mar. 31 2013), https://perma.cc/A3M3-GMA6.
UNCTAD, Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITS: Impact on Investor-State Claims,
IIA Issues Note, No. 2, 2010, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/6.
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT
POLICIES, UNCTAD/WIR/2012 at 84 (2012).
See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011: NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, UNCTAD/WIR/2011 at 102–03 (2011).

Summer 2017

23

Chicago Journal of International Law

dropping and some power centers pushing back on the use of arbitration, even as
the overall number of BITs and arbitrations continues to increase.
Ultimately, for BITs to realize their potential as an important component of
the law of cyber peace, the political and legal costs of these agreements need to be
mitigated and interest rekindled on the part of developed and developing nations
alike. Greater attention will also need to be paid to the compensation standard in
play, since compulsory licenses will likely not fully compensate those that have
lost trade secrets. Further, more transparency is needed in the investor-state
arbitration arena to help address legal fragmentation and build the precedent
necessary for stable and predictable international customary cybersecurity law.
The absence of transparency is a growing concern in the international community
as investor-state arbitration rates increase, but there have been positive steps made
in this regard that should be reinforced in future BITs.

G. World Trade Organization
Aside from BITs, cybersecurity is also becoming an important topic in
regional and global trade negotiations. Ongoing U.S.-E.U. trade talks have been
shaped in part by cybersecurity and privacy concerns, especially in the aftermath
of NSA surveillance programs and intellectual property protections. 143 The
proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership also has a cybersecurity component (which
may still move forward without immediate U.S. participation), 144 and even the
World Trade Organization (WTO) employs enforcement mechanisms that may
be applicable to cyberattacks if national security concerns could be overcome. 145
Together, these multilateral investment and trade regimes could provide a basis
for fostering regional collaboration to enhance global cybersecurity at a time of
relatively slow progress on domestic and multilateral cybersecurity
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policymaking. 146 Yet the applicability of these regimes to cybersecurity has been
underappreciated in the literature to date, 147 in part because of legitimate concerns
about the utility of this field of law as applied to cybersecurity that requires
clarification and reform, as is discussed further below. Specifically, this Subsection
builds from the foregoing discussion of BITs to ascertain the applicability of
multilateral trade forums—notably the WTO—in helping to foster a law of cyber
peace.
Beginning in 1994, the WTO expanded its coverage from trade in goods and
trade in services to coverage of intellectual property through TRIPS. 148 Article 39
of this Agreement references trade secrets, which could be invaluable to negatively
impacted individuals and firms that have been the victims of intellectual property
theft. 149 As members of the WTO, both the U.S. and China, along with other
important cyber powers such as Russia, are bound by the trade secret standards
mandated by TRIPS. 150 Yet criticism of TRIPS has continued as applied to trade
secrets; for example, some have argued that TRIPS has too limited coverage and
an inadequate compensation regime. Similarly, even though States often comply
with WTO judgments, 151 it has “no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets,
no truncheons or tear gas.” 152 In other words, enforcement continues to be
problematic, leaving the utility of this vehicle to help address the plight of victims
in cross-border transactions involving trade secrets theft uncertain. More
generally, the WTO has to date been ineffective as a forum for enhancing global
cybersecurity because of the aforementioned national security exception. BITs
may also be hobbled by the same exception unless perhaps the “good faith”
standard put forward by the U.S. catches on and is made more robust. 153
Ultimately, however, both bottom-up (e.g., BITs) and top-down (e.g., WTO)
regimes have unique benefits and drawbacks, necessitating a polycentric approach
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to enhancing cybersecurity and building a law of cyber peace coupled with relevant
analogies from public international law.

III. T HE P UBLIC I NTER NATIONAL L AW OF C YBER P EACE
Although the private law of cyber peace offers a number of helpful insights
regarding ways to enhance global cybersecurity law and policy by harnessing this
patchwork of tools, model laws, and data on State practice, it is vital to not ignore
the public law of cyber peace. Indeed, this is the body of law with the longest
history in regulating global commons spaces, and thus it is important to review it
to understand what governance gaps may be filled. This Section undertakes this
task by proceeding as follows: First, analogies from arms control regimes are
considered, focusing on the interwar years and the nuclear war context. Second,
global commons regimes are explored, including space, Antarctica, climate
change, and the law of the sea. Third and finally, related regimes including
MLATs, extradition treaties, and custom, are explored before moving on to
discuss how the public law of cyber peace may be combined with private
international law to create the legal foundation for a global culture of
cybersecurity.

A. Applying Arms Control Regimes
Arms control treaties have long helped limit the risk of conflict escalation
across an array of contexts, to varying degrees of success. This Section investigates
the history of two such efforts focusing on the interwar years between World War
I and World War II and efforts to reign in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 154
Although negotiated in different contexts during varied historical epochs, parallels
and cautionary tales are drawn to the cybersecurity arena.

1. Interwar Arms Control: Being Cognizant of the Roots of
Cyber Conflict.
Following the disastrous results of World War I, with millions of armed
forces casualties, 155 the great powers embarked on an effort to limit the size of
their own and antagonistic armed forces to limit the risk of future global armed
conflict. The resulting major arms control treaties of the 1920s and 1930s
primarily determined national strength in terms of fleet size. 156 This changed in
154
155

156
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https://perma.cc/V99P-RVSP.
See Caroline F. Ziemke, Peace Without Strings? Interwar Naval Arms Control Revisited, 15 WASH. Q.,
Autumn 1992, at 87 (1992).

26

Vol. 18 No. 1

The Law of Cyber Peace

Shackelford

the post-World War II period, when “strategic nuclear capability . . . replaced
fleets as the measure of global power status.” 157 However, the interwar years do
convey “an image of a policy environment not unlike our own today,” replete with
the military grappling with the consequences of a technological revolution built
on new products such as fighter planes, submarines, and tanks (as opposed to IT
during the modern Revolution of Military Affairs), along with the complexities of
navigating multipolar politics. 158
The interwar arms control regime was based on the 1922 Washington Treaty
that placed limits on naval fleet sizes, and was followed by a slew of other treaties
designed to ward off another arms race. 159 They failed. Why? 160 Among the lessons
learned from this experience by scholars was that “by ignoring underlying sources
of conflict, technical agreements may exacerbate insecurity.” 161 An example is the
1930 London Naval Treaty, which “reaffirmed Japan’s defensive superiority in the
Pacific,” but failed to address Western and Japanese policy differences toward a
unified China. 162 Thus, whereas cyber arms control is not necessarily impossible,
to effectively keep the relative cyber peace, agreements must be as comprehensive
as possible and take into account the likely reasons that a cyber conflict would
start. A cyber weapons treaty would do little good, for example, if negotiators
ignored its status during an armed conflict or the geopolitical context in which a
conflict could arise, such as U.S.-China relations over Taiwan, or an attributed
attack on critical infrastructure. Consequently, the interwar arms control treaties
provide a fruitful cautionary tale for what can happen when good intentions race
ahead of good policy that takes realpolitik into account for future agreements.

2. The Analogy of Nuclear War.
According to Jim Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
we understand nearly as much about the relationship between cyber conflict and
international security now as we did about strategic thinking related to nuclear
weapons in the early 1950s. 163 Assuming that is the case, then it may be helpful to
briefly consider the conventions and applicable case law on nuclear warfare to
frame contemporary efforts aimed at controlling cyber weapons. During the 1950s
157
158
159

160

161
162
163

Id.
Robin Ranger, Learning from the Naval Arms Control Experience, 10 WASH. Q. 47 (1987) (writing in the
1980s, but still with some application to the present).
EMILY O. GOLDMAN, SUNKEN TREATIES: NAVAL ARMS CONTROL BETWEEN THE WARS 33–34
(1994).
See Sean Watts, Regulation-Tolerant Weapons, Regulation-Resistant Weapons, and The Law of War, 91 INT'L
L. STUD. 540, 540 (2015).
Goldman, supra note 159, at 30.
Id.
James A. Lewis, The “Korean” Cyber Attacks and Their Implications for Cyber Conflict, CTR. STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUD. 2 (Oct. 2009), https://perma.cc/Y7GD-5MT8.

Summer 2017

27

Chicago Journal of International Law

and 1960s, nuclear policy was a tightly veiled secret with relatively little public
discussion, 164 similar to early debates on state-sponsored cyber attacks. 165 That was
until Herman Kahn’s books, including On Thermonuclear War and Thinking About
the Unthinkable, began a renaissance in scholarly work on the topic that had a great
impact on U.S. nuclear policy. 166 The most significant legal decision on the use of
nuclear weapons came in 1994, when the U.N. General Assembly voted to submit
a request for an advisory opinion to the ICJ on the question of “whether the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful.” 167 The U.S. argued in the case that
nuclear weapons cannot be banned in the abstract, but rather each case “must be
examined individually.” 168 Ultimately, the ICJ stated that the threat or use of
nuclear weapons “would generally be contrary to the rules of international law.” 169
However, the court did not define whether “the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which
the very survival of a State would be at stake.” 170 Even though the ICJ did not
declare all nuclear weapons illegal, the logic of its holding, that “methods and
means of warfare . . . which would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants,
are prohibited,” 171 is applicable to cyber conflict given the interconnectivity of
cyberspace and resulting potential for damage as seen in attacks like Stuxnet. 172
The ICJ has not explicitly considered the legality of cyber weapons to this
point. 173 Custom, as was mentioned in Section II, requires widespread State
practice that is undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation. 174 State practice in
the aftermath of cyber attacks seems to suggest a lack of consensus on how best
to respond. Consider the initial reaction, or lack thereof, from states including Iran
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following Stuxnet. 175 However, the fact that States often attempt to hide their
cyber activities through intermediaries or otherwise obfuscate could be
understood as implicitly acknowledging the unlawfulness of the actions. It may
also suggest a growing recognition that certain cyber attacks breach the customary
international law norm of nonintervention as seen in recent G20 and G7
cybersecurity pronouncements discussed further in Section IV. 176 Yet, even in the
absence of custom, several treaty regimes may provide a basis for the regulation
of some cyber attacks under international law that fall below the armed attack
threshold, at least until new regimes come online, including in the global commons
context discussed next.

B. Analogizing Global Commons Regimes
As difficult as the regulation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
may present, it is even more complex to prohibit the use of cyber attacks under
international law, due in no small part to technical challenges, verification issues,
and the attribution problem, among other concerns. 177 Nevertheless, some
nations, such as Russia, potentially fearing Western digital dominance, are pushing
for such an arms control-style cyber treaty. 178 Given the political, technical, and
legal difficulties of such an approach, this Subsection instead considers lessons
gleaned from other treaty systems governing the global commons that have
sought to limit the use of weapons to help build out the law of cyber peace,
including arms control treaties during the interwar period, nuclear weapons law,
space law, and the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). The Subsection concludes with
an analysis of other applicable accords.

1. Introducing the Global Commons.
A “commons” is a general term meaning “a resource shared by a group of
people.” 179 The notion of the commons can mean either a “resource system” or
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“a property rights regime,” depending on context. 180 As the term is used here, the
notion is that certain areas (such as the sky, relevant in the climate change context)
belong to all and should be preserved for posterity instead of private persons or
the State exclusively managing the resource. 181 Under international law,
“commons” are the exception, not the rule, given that territorial sovereignty has
in large part defined international relations and international law since the 1648
Treaty of Westphalia, which ushered in the modern nation-state system. 182 The
notion of the global commons posits that there are limits to national sovereignty
in certain parts of the world, and that these areas should be “open to use by the
[international] community but closed to exclusive appropriation” by treaty or
custom. 183 At its height, the global commons comprised nearly seventy-five
percent of the earth’s surface, including the high seas and Antarctica, as well as
outer space, the atmosphere, and some argue, cyberspace. 184 Some of these regions
were gradually regulated to a greater or lesser extent not by individual countries,
but by the international community at times through the vague Common Heritage
of Mankind (CHM) concept. 185 More recently, this trend has reversed itself; for
instance, individual coastal nations, rather than the international community, now
control the vast majority of readily accessible offshore resources. 186 The same
trend might be playing out in cyberspace where many nations are seeking to assert
greater control online, further challenging the notion of cyberspace as a
commons. 187 Indeed, is cyberspace really still a commons, and for that matter, was
it ever? Or is it being enclosed to such an extent that it is becoming a form of
private property, or even an extension of national territory? Fundamentally, who
enjoys sovereignty in cyberspace, and how might it be exercised? And why do
these distinctions matter for cybersecurity? 188 These are the questions that drive
the analysis of the “cyber pseudo-commons,” necessitating an analysis of other
global commons regions to glean governance best practices. These examples are
framed around historic lessons and policy options from each applicable regime,
180
181
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which are in turn summarized in Section IV as part of a polycentric approach to
building out a law of cyber peace.

2. From the Digital Frontier to the Final Frontier: Arms Limitation in
Space Law as an Analogy for Cyber War.
Outer space is inherently similar to cyberspace; both are vast areas
encompassing both territorial and extraterritorial components. Like the weapons
systems that have been developed to attack satellites, cyber attacks could have a
large-scale strategic impact, both on terrestrial and orbiting assets. 189 In short, the
use of either anti-satellite or sophisticated cyber weapons can be game changers.
More broadly, both outer space and cyberspace are domains in which intelligence
gathering has been widely tolerated, even though the outcry has been greater in
the case of cyber espionage than orbital reconnaissance. 190 The nature of
cyberspace also makes tracking difficult, because even though the physical
Internet is routed in particular jurisdictions, controlling the packets of information
that comprise cyberspace is another matter. 191 Similarly, “[s]pacecraft and satellites
in orbit pass above many different sovereign jurisdictions,” 192 similar to the myriad
jurisdictions through which cyber attacks transit. 193
Space and telecommunications systems are intertwined with cyberspace,
including in such areas as imagery collection, navigation, and signals intelligence,
to say nothing of sustainable use discussed further below. 194 However, space law’s
failure to address whether the legal regime applies during an armed conflict limits
its utility as applied to promoting cyber peace. Moreover, the military use of space
was not forbidden by the OST, while, according to the Department of Defense
(DOD), “[t]here is no legal prohibition against developing and using space control
weapons,” 195 for example, save for placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of
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mass destruction (WMDs) into orbit. 196 A growing list of nations is developing
space weapons. 197 Vision for 2020, a 1998 U.S. government report, explains that
the U.S. should dominate space, a view shared by retired General Joseph W. Ashy,
formerly of U.S. Space Command, who has said: “It’s politically sensitive, but it’s
going to happen . . . we’re going to fight in space.” 198
International efforts to form a legal regime for space weapons have been
nearly as happenstance as those aimed at limiting cyber weapons. 199 Russia and
China have advocated for an expanded regime to control both space and cyber
weapons. 200 Yet unlike the sophisticated infrastructure and advanced technology
needed to develop and deploy space weapons, nearly all nations participate in the
Information Age to some degree, whereas only some eighty nations have engaged
in space exploration, and fewer still could be considered actively spacefaring. 201
Barring a major conflict, most States do not expect or have the resources “to be
either an attacker or a defender” in space in the near term. 202 In contrast, nearly
“all states can reasonably expect to be both” 203 an attacker and defender in
cyberspace to some degree, which can make reaching consensus difficult.
In summary, analogizing space law illustrates that it is possible to regulate an
area of the global commons to bar the most egregious military weapons systems,
as this regime has done with nuclear weapons placed in orbit. Space law, however,
does not fit the mold of cyber peace given the prevalence of cyber attacks, none
of which are equivalent to a WMD attack. 204 There is no cyber equivalent of a
nuclear weapon––no single attack now known that can, by itself, bring a country
to its knees. 205 A more apt analogy may be the collective action problem of space
junk. Some estimates place the total number of objects capable of damaging a
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https://perma.cc/6U5B-C9EN (emphasis in original).
See, for example, Turner Brinton, Obama’s Proposed Space Weapon Ban Draws Mixed Response, SPACE.COM
(Feb. 4, 2009), https://perma.cc/42FK-NQY9.
See Press Release, General Assembly, Prevention of Outer Space Arms Race, Ratification of Nuclear
Test-Ban Treaty Among Issues Addressed by Texts Introduced in First Committee, U.N. Press
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spacecraft at more than thirty-five million, making attribution difficult. 206 As with
a stray bolt damaging a satellite, a piece of malware can wreak havoc with disparate
websites and networks. As of 2015, however, there has been little multilateral
agreement on how to better manage orbital debris, though limited polycentric
initiatives have been undertaken that could be informative to cyber
peacebuilding. 207 Instead of finding analogies to ban certain types of code then,
might it be possible (and desirable) to regulate all cyber attacks under public
international law?

3. Freeze the Code: The Antarctic Treaty System Approach to
Cyber Attacks.
Rather than banning only certain types of cyber attacks, another (admittedly
difficult and complex) option to consider is regulating all cyber attacks. The
Antarctic Treaty, which besides managing a continent was the first arms control
treaty of the Cold War, provides a fruitful analogue because it goes further than
the OST and bans all military activities. 208 The main objective of the Antarctic
Treaty System (ATS) is to ensure “that Antarctica shall continue forever to be
used exclusively for peaceful purposes.” 209 Like Antarctica, the Internet is a rich
resource, being a repository of knowledge and a vital channel for commerce and
communications. However, imposing a freeze on developing new software that
could be used to launch malicious exploits, even if it were possible, would likely
not be preferable given that it could stifle innovation, among other legitimate
concerns. 210 Nor would a traditional international accord likely be capable of
keeping up with rapidly changing IT, necessitating a kind of standing publicprivate committee of cybersecurity experts that could analyze industry best
practices and help identify new security threats as they arise. Subsequent
enforcement and coordination would thereafter pose daunting challenges. On the
surface, then, it appears that neither barring certain malignant code nor all possible
variations of cyber attacks under international law is an effective, efficient
206
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response to the cyber threat without substantial technological improvements. 211
What then about the potential of using either atmospheric governance or
international communications to prosecute attackers and their facilitators?

4. On Climate Change and Cyber Attacks.
It is difficult to think of two issues with a greater potential to negatively
impact both our natural environment and the global economy than climate change
and cyber attacks. Though the long-term estimates on both are notoriously hard
to pin down, contested estimates on the cost of cyber attacks range from
approximately $400 billion for 2014 to more than $3 trillion by 2020. 212 Similarly,
the cost of climate change has been estimated at some $1.2 trillion annually, which
works out to roughly 1.6 percent of global GDP. 213 Moreover, although the
atmosphere and cyberspace are distinct extraterritorial arenas, they share similar
problems of overuse, difficulties of enforcement, and the associated challenges of
collective inaction and free riders. 214 It is also true that actions taken by a
multiplicity of actors on different governance scales (from local to global) can
impact both the global climate change problem and the cause of promoting cyber
peace. This is part and parcel of the literature on polycentric governance—
sometimes called the Bloomington School of Political Economy—which is
quickly coming into vogue as the preferred model of tackling “new” global
collective action problems, marking a shift from twentieth century models of
global commons governance and is discussed further in Section IV.
Applying the complete corpus of international environmental law, or even
that segment focusing on atmospheric governance, is beyond the scope of this
Article. 215 However, there are targeted lessons from the ongoing climate change
negotiations that deserve attention, beginning with the Montreal Protocol before
moving on to the Twenty-First U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21) 2015 meeting in Paris. 216
Much like Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring helped jumpstart a global
conversation about the state of environmental protection, and Garrett Hardin’s
article The Tragedy of the Commons helped popularize the dangers of open access
regimes, another article, this time by three British scientists, helped precipitate
211
212

213
214
215
216
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arguably the most successful international treaty in history—the Montreal
Protocol—which, in 2009, became the first U.N. treaty to achieve universal
ratification after the U.N. Charter itself. 217 Why has the Montreal Protocol been
so successful, and what lessons does it hold for climate change and for that matter
cybersecurity? In short, the science was clear, scarcity was plain, alternatives were
available, and geopolitics was simpler. 218 This state of affairs stands in opposition
to how the climate change context during the UNFCCC COP process, which were
long mired in geopolitical, international economic, and security challenges, as were
brought into sharp relief at COP15 in 2009. 219 COP21 succeeded where COP15
failed largely because of the high number of serious national climate pledges on
the lead up to the conference itself, with the U.S.-China announcement on
bilateral emissions reductions leading the way. 220 By July 2015, nearly five months
before COP21 would convene, more than a dozen nations, plus the E.U., had
made climate pledges, with many more to come. 221 Analogizing atmospheric
governance to promoting cyber peace, a push could be made to follow the COP21
approach in the cyber context and encourage transparency, such as by nations
announcing pledges that best fit their unique national circumstances ahead of
multi-stakeholder cybersecurity forums. The U.S.-China G2 Cybersecurity Code
of Conduct is a helpful step forward in this direction, as are the G20 and G7
cybersecurity pronouncements discussed further in Section IV.

5. Applying the Law of the Sea to Promote Cyber Peace.
The Law of the Sea (LOS), like outer space, Antarctica, and the atmosphere,
enjoys parallels with cyberspace. The codification process that resulted in the first
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty began in
1945, leading to UNCLOS I in 1958. 222 However, UNCLOS I did not sufficiently
address concerns about the legal status of the deep seabed lying underneath the
high seas, highlighting the need for further negotiations. 223 Relatively little was
accomplished at UNCLOS II due to geopolitical divides. 224 This served as an
217
218
219
220
221
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impetus for UNCLOS III, which was tasked with regulating the use, exploration,
and exploitation of all living and non-living resources of the high seas, 225 a vast
area comprising more than seventy percent of the planet’s surface. 226 Still, the role
of the private sector remained truncated, a cautionary tale when considering paths
toward revamping Internet governance to promote cyber peace. As the deep
seabed mining provisions of UNCLOS proved unsatisfactory to the developed
world, the treaty was amended in 1994 to better comport with private economic
development, 227provisions that are now being put to the test with the uptick in
deep seabed exploration by mining firms. 228
Among the provisions of UNCLOS III that may be applied to cybersecurity
include Article 19, which states that a nation should not use another “nation’s
territorial sea to engage in activities prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security
of the coastal State.” 229 This prohibition includes the collection of information,
distribution of propaganda, or interference with systems of communications 230—
provisions that have direct application to such exploits as Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks. Moreover, Article 113 requires domestic criminal
legislation to punish willful damage to submarine cables, 231 which represent the
fiber-optic circulatory system of the global Internet. Depending on how broadly
“damage” is conceived, 232 an argument could be made that the Article 19
prohibition should also apply to Article 21 and 113 claims involving submarine
cables. 233 This could mean that, depending on State practice, cyber attackers who
send code through submarine cables that come to shore in coastal States could be
in breach of UNCLOS. However, this does not include enforcement mechanisms
beyond calls for domestic criminal legislation, highlighting the need for State
practice to mirror international treaty obligations if the law of cyber peace is to be
an effective deterrent to cyber attackers.
225
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UNCLOS is also an important example of a regime that was unsuccessful
until it better recognized the needs of the private sector. Both proposed and
existing legal regimes being applied to strengthen cyber peace should similarly
ensure sufficient protections for private enterprise to promote engagement and
spur innovation by not sidelining private entities as Internet governance
evolves. 234 Relatedly, the history of UNCLOS also underscores the importance of
including non-state actors and effective public-private partnerships in polycentric
efforts aimed at managing global common pool resources, 235 including the
Internet.

C. Considering Other Applicable Accords
Building from the analysis of global commons regimes, this final Subsection
investigates the utility of other applicable public accords—focusing on
international telecommunications law, MLATs, and extradition treaties—before
moving on to an analysis of governance gaps undertaken in Section IV.

1. International Communications Law and Cyber Attacks.
In many ways, the development of international communications law was
the direct precursor to cyber law, beginning with agreements dating from the
1800s designed to protect the first submarine cables. 236 A key focal point for
modern telecommunications governance is the ITU, the oldest still-active
intergovernmental organization in the world. 237 For more than 150 years, the ITU
has been the primary organization responsible for multilateral telecom
governance, 238 and more recently it has also played a role in Internet governance. 239
The ITU Convention militates against “harmful interference,” defined in Annex
3 of the document as that which “endangers . . . safety services, or seriously degrades,
obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radio communication service.” 240 “Safety
services” include technologies “used permanently or temporarily for the
safeguarding of human life and property,” which could conceivably refer to public
services such as health, police, and public transport, along with critical

234
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infrastructure more generally, all of which are vulnerable to cyber attacks. 241
However, the lack of mandatory enforcement mechanisms and its failure to apply
during armed conflicts limits the efficacy of this regime, as does political resistance
from some stakeholders to empower the ITU to have a larger role in enhancing
global cybersecurity. 242
The ITU Convention also gives governments wide discretion in regulating
private activity that “may appear dangerous to the security of the State,” 243
including acts “contrary to . . . public order, or to decency.” 244 Such broad
authority opens the door to a wide range of domestic regulatory interventions in
Internet governance. Indeed, at least according to the U.S. DOD, international
communications law currently “contains no direct and specific prohibition”
against the use of cyber attacks “by military forces, even in peacetime.” 245 As a
result, whereas elements within the ITU Charter may help the international
community manage cyber attacks, it offers limited guidance in promoting cyber
peace without additional support.

2. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.
Numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties dealing with everything from
legal assistance, extradition, diplomatic relations, and friendship, to status of
forces agreements, also include provisions that impact cybersecurity. The U.S., for
example, is party to dozens of MLATs that could be used to seek criminal
prosecution of cyber attackers, especially those MLATs that either explicitly
mention IT or are termed broadly enough to cover all law enforcement
investigations. 246 However, there are often no enforceable obligations under these
treaties, limiting their utility, as seen in the 2007 alleged Russian cyber attacks on
Estonia, and the 2013 episode regarding Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
refusal to extradite accused NSA leaker Edward Snowden to U.S. authorities
despite the presence of a U.S.-Russia MLAT. 247 The U.S. is also “a party to more
than a hundred bilateral extradition treaties.” 248 Without such accords, national
241
242
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244
245
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governments would “have neither an international obligation nor the domestic
authority to deliver custody of an individual” for prosecution in a foreign
jurisdiction. 249 These treaties could be amended to more effectively bring the
perpetrators of cyber attacks to justice, such as by including incentives for
information sharing, sanctions for noncompliance, and making their coverage
more explicit. There is, in fact, an effort to update the U.S.-U.K. MLAT along
these lines. 250 States may be willing to expend the political capital to make these
revisions due to the gravity of the cyber risk that they face, along with the
increasing clarity surrounding the extent of interconnection within the global
networked commons.

3. Extradition Treaties and Diplomatic Relations.
Another avenue to promote cyber peace would be to leverage existing
treaties to help safeguard certain tempting targets such as embassies. The 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations enshrines the right of “inviolability
of the premises” of a diplomatic mission, its archives, private residences and
property of its agents, and its communications. 251 Applied to the law of cyber
peace, then, this regime could protect all transmissions made to and from
government embassies and missions against cyber attacks or espionage. This
regime would be applicable in attacks that have already been waged against
Russian and Japanese embassies, among others. 252 The reverse has also occurred,
such as when the U.S. declared Venezuela’s consul general a persona non grata
after she allegedly planned cyber attacks against U.S. networks. 253 Still, some
countries are not relying on such legal instruments to protect themselves, such as
Estonia, which has taken the proactive step of creating a “virtual embassy” to back
up its citizens’ data outside of its geographic borders. 254
Treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation could also be used to
leverage the prospects for cyber peace. 255 Other applicable frameworks to a law
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of cyber peace include countermeasures allowing states to respond to violations, 256
several U.N. General Assembly resolutions relating to cybersecurity, 257 and limited
regional initiatives such as NATO’s cybersecurity efforts, along with the Council
of Europe, Organization of American States, and Shanghai Cooperation
Organization’s cybersecurity initiatives.

IV. T OWARD A C OMBINED L AW OF C YBER P EACE : A
P OLYCENTRIC P ATH F ORWARD
Section III undertook a wide-ranging, non-comprehensive investigation into
some of the sources of public international law that, together, could be leveraged
to help build out the law of cyber peace if the limitations described are overcome.
While a patchwork, these regimes together provide a helpful polycentric
foundation that could be synergistically refined through additional protocols and
public-private partnerships across a range of industries, sectors, and country
groupings. To ascertain the promise of such an approach in further building out
the law of cyber peace (assuming that new treaty formation remains off the table
for geopolitical reasons), Section IV begins by further unpacking the benefits and
drawbacks of polycentric governance in the cybersecurity context before moving
on to discuss implications for policymakers and managers.

A. The Frontiers (and Limits) of Polycentrism
Increasingly, leaders such as the former President of Estonia, Toomas Ilves;
the former Director of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN), Fadi Chehadé; and even Nobel Laureates such as Professor
Elinor Ostrom have proffered polycentric governance as the best path forward to
addressing the global collective action problems of climate change and cyber
attacks. 258 Indeed, already some of the public- and private-sector efforts
highlighted in this Article may be bearing fruit with, by some estimates, the
severity of cyber attacks beginning to plateau and “an emerging norm against the

256
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use of severe state-based cyber tactics” emerging. 259 But it is equally important to
consider the evolution and limits of this approach.
It may be easiest to understand polycentric governance in juxtaposition to
the alternative—monocentrism, which is a political system where the authority to
enforce rules is “vested in a single decision structure that has an ultimate
monopoly over the legitimate exercise of coercive capabilities.” 260 At its core—
building from important notions of legitimacy, power, and multiple decision
centers—polycentric governance is concerned with the rule of law. In this manner,
the U.S. constitution has been described as an “experiment in polycentricity,” with
federalism being one way to operationalize the concept. 261 Professor Michael
Polanyi did a great deal to develop and advance the field of polycentric
governance. In many ways, his approach was original in that it began with a
realization as to the importance of social organization in the process of scientific
discovery above and beyond strict adherence to the “scientific method.” 262 He
realized, for example, that polycentric structures are vital for scientific discovery
given that the inherent “freedom is utilized to search for an abstract end goal
(objective truth).” 263 This can only occur in the absence of an overarching
authority in arenas driven by ideals including beauty, truth, and justice in the
contexts of art, religion, and the law. 264 In this way, capitalism itself may be seen
as polycentric given that it incorporates “a web of many agents that constantly
adjust their behavior to the decisions made by others.” 265 This may be compared
against a monocentric-socialist system in which a centralized command and
control authority is tasked with organizing a top-down structure for making
production decisions. 266 In such a polycentric system, ideas of equity and justice,
Polanyi argued, may only be crystallized by a gradual process of trial-and-error
experimentation. 267 Arguably, we are undertaking such experimentation now at
the global level, with divergent State and private-sector practice geared toward
promoting cyber peace as was discussed in Sections II and III.
Professor Lon Fuller agreed with Polanyi’s assessment with regards to
polycentrism, arguing that many legal decisions are in fact polycentric in that they
involve multiple “decision centers and the network of cause and effect
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
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relationships is not understood very well.” 268 Such a conceptualization of the
justice system highlights, among other issues, the prevalence of unintended
consequences that can frustrate justice seekers. 269 As such, Professor Fuller argued
that as the degree of polycentricity in a system increases, judges should be more
inclined to leave a decision to either the competitive market or to the political
branches. 270 Similar arguments could be made with regards to cybersecurity,
especially given the difficulty involved with identifying cybersecurity best practices
in a dynamic technological environment. However, debates swirling around a
cybersecurity market failure 271 and the relative lack of action by the U.S. Congress
on cybersecurity militate against the courts deferring to the other branches.
The Ostroms’ work on polycentric governance, begun in the 1960s, was
initially centered on questions of metropolitan governance, but subsequently
evolved in two directions—social theory, and empirical investigations of
governance structures. The Ostroms argued that coordination in complex systems
is in fact possible through interorganizational arrangements that “would manifest
market-like characteristics and display both efficiency-inducing and errorcorrecting behavior.” 272 In other words, by taking a political economy approach,
the Ostroms were able to show that “competition among public agencies is not
necessarily inefficient.” 273 Yet the great leap in governance research was the
Ostroms’ contention to test their presumption, “to undertake critical tests where
divergent theories imply contradictory conclusions.” 274 This was the birth of
empirical polycentric governance research, the ramifications of which continue to
resonate around the world in a wide array of contexts, including with regards to
cybersecurity.
As applied to cybersecurity, the field of polycentric governance has an array
of particularized lessons drawn from Professor Ostrom’s work, as summarized in
her Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) Framework. 275 This is a framework
of governance best practice gleaned from decades of commons field studies and
268
269
270
271
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applied, among other contexts, to global commons issues including atmospheric
governance. Some of these principles similarly have resonance to the cause of
cybersecurity due diligence, including the need to undertake effective cost-benefit
analysis, 276 conduct supply chain monitoring with an eye toward spotting hardware
and software vulnerabilities, and institute governance strategies that permit ample
space for innovation while still mandating proven best practices. 277 The latter goal
may be furthered by, for example, requiring NIST Cybersecurity Framework
compliance for all suppliers and potential partners, something that more firms are
undertaking. For example, in early 2015, Bank of America announced “that it is
using the Framework and will also require it of its vendors,” while “QVC is
announcing that it is using the Cybersecurity Framework in its risk
management.” 278
At a more global level, this approach highlights support for minilateral norm
building, which we are already seeing across a number of fora including the G2,
G7, and G20. For example, the G2 Cybersecurity Code of Conduct that was
mentioned in the introduction calls for mutual restraint in cyber economic
espionage, particularly the theft of trade secrets. 279 Similarly, the G7 continued its
work on cybersecurity in 2016, publishing its view that “no country should
conduct or knowingly support ICT-enabled (information and communication
technology) theft of intellectual property” and that all G7 nations should work to
“preserve the global nature of the Internet,” including the free flow of information
in a nod to the notion of cyberspace as a “global networked commons.” 280 The
2015 G20 has perhaps been the most active forum pushing, in particular, the
international law of cyber peace, stating in a 2015 communique, for example, that:
(1) “international law, including the United Nations (UN) Charter, applies to
nation-state conduct in cyberspace;” and (2) “no country should conduct or
support the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.” 281 Similarly, the U.S.
proposed three peacetime norms that were accepted for inclusion in the 2015
U.N. Group of Governmental Experts consensus report, which includes language
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on protecting critical infrastructure, safeguarding Computer Security Incident
Response Teams, and collaborating on cybercrime investigations. 282
These forums are proving invaluable for minilateral norm building that is
helping to crystallize State practice. Overall, this form of polycentric undertaking
is similar to efforts like the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(Guiding Principles) Framework approach authored by Professor John Ruggie,
which encourages greater stakeholder buy-in from diverse organizations rather
than a multilateral, top-down approach to promoting human rights in business
practices. 283 Such an approach could also aid in norm building by norm
entrepeneurs, such as leading businesses and governments announcing efforts that
could eventually cause a “norm cascade” in which cybersecurity best practices
become internalized and eventually codified in national and international laws. 284
Ultimately, though, the trick is finding the appropriate “balance between simplicity
and complexity” to better leverage the power of polycentric governance to
promote cyber peace. 285

B. Summary and Implications
Taken together, the diverse sources of private and public international law
discussed in this Article provide the beginnings of a legal framework to manage
cyber attacks during peacetime. The private and public sectors are pioneering
systems of cybersecurity due diligence and cyber risk insurance that are already
helping to mitigate the cyber risk of an array of small, medium, and large
organizations. Existing bilateral and multilateral trade and investment treaties
provide the ability for private entities to protect their intellectual property such as
through international arbitration. If a host nation’s domestic laws criminalize
cyber attacks, then applicable MLATs and extradition treaties would apply to
make perpetrators accountable in various jurisdictions. If the attack were directed
against a foreign mission or embassy, then the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Immunity would provide certain remedies and potentially reparations to the
victim nation, potentially combined with virtual embassy schemes such as the one
currently pioneered by Estonia. Moreover, provisions under UNCLOS III
282
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regulating submarine cables, the ability to prosecute private parties in breach of
the ITU treaty in telecommunications law, and interference with satellite
transmissions in space law, all place restrictions on cyber attackers. This regime
has been criticized as “patchwork,” 286 partly because of prevalent enforcement
and verification concerns. 287 But it is a foundation, however limited, from which
to build the edifice of cyber peace.
If political impasses are overcome and State practice further crystallizes,
negotiators could craft a new cybersecurity treaty to improve upon the suboptimal
status quo that: (1) defines appropriate graduated sanctions against nations
harboring or sponsoring cybercriminals and terrorists where possible; (2) clarifies
which international legal provisions apply below the armed attack threshold; (3)
establishes a regime for attribution that includes robust information sharing; (4)
provides for enforcement mechanisms; and (5) provides a system of efficient
dispute resolution. 288 Several proposals have been made along these lines, and
indeed it may be possible to build on recent norm development, such as from the
G20, by requiring a duty to assist victim nations, not interfering with cybersecurity
investigations (including first responders), and codifying a prohibition on
attacking critical infrastructure. 289
Ultimately, the limitations of existing regimes, created by analogy and the
extension of principles developed to suit different challenges, demonstrate the
limits of international laws to enhance cybersecurity. Internet freedom arguments
about the “unregulatability of BITs” and the ability of attackers to circumvent
national borders remain powerful especially given rapid technological
advancements, but have been partly undermined by the work of scholars, such as
Professor Joel Reidenberg, who have advocated for the potential of private
regulatory regimes to serve as proxies for laws. 290 However, the fundamental
difficulty of enforcing regulations in cyberspace remains apparent given problems
of attribution, environmental plasticity, and the inter-networked nature of
cyberspace, among other challenges. 291 This means that although regulation is
possible in cyberspace, it is fraught with difficulties. It is best, then, to consider
law and norms alongside market-based incentives and code as part of a polycentric
system for fostering cyber peace given the absence of a comprehensive legal
286
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regime. By stacking such regimes, as it were, gaps within one arena may be offset
by coverage in another such that more robust coverage results.
What other options exist in enhancing cybersecurity beyond adapting
existing treaties? Some argue for the widespread use of preventative self-defense
with its attendant dangers of international instability and escalation. 292 Others
would prefer a regime of universal jurisdiction, whereby any State would be able
to prosecute cyber attackers. 293 An extreme option is a movement toward a
surveillance society such that every State would have greater information
awareness, raising obvious privacy implications while not necessarily contributing
to overall cybersecurity. 294 Among other issues, each of these approaches raises
the thorny problem of harmonization, as well as reciprocity. Given that the U.S.
remains a leading cyber power, U.S. cybersecurity policy may well be mirrored
back; we have to be comfortable with the reflection.

V. C ONCLUSION
International law changes with events: as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
wrote, “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.” 295 It is
essential for policymakers to consider cyber attacks as the revolutionary threat that
they are to the security and welfare of citizens around the world in order for real
and lasting progress to be made. But it is equally necessary for scholars, jurists,
and negotiators to place a greater emphasis on developing and clarifying the law
of cyber peace, given that this legal regime will be responsible for managing
responses to the vast majority of cyber attacks. 296 Important work, including
Tallinn 2.0, has contributed greatly to this effort, but much more remains to be
done, particularly with regards to ascertaining the status of customary
international cybersecurity law based on data about State practice, and the overall
regime effectiveness of various cyber laws. This Article has explored how some
existing private and public sources of international law may be applied to promote
cyber peace. As has been shown, there is not an absence of law in cyberspace. It
is far from the untamed digital Wild West that it is at times made out to be. The
issue is one of reconceptualizing cyber attacks and determining appropriate
responses within an evolving polycentric system. Existing regimes should not be
abandoned, or their value underappreciated, in favor of new cybersecurity
accords, given that little clarity exists as to what such treaties might look like, even
292
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if it was politically feasible to negotiate and ratify them. Better, one might think,
to bolster the process of legal clarification and norm building now, and not let the
great be the enemy of the good.
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